Irrational Beliefs 16
THE IMPACT OF GENERAL AND SPECIFIC RATIONAL AND IRRATIONAL BELIEFS ON EXAM DISTRESS; A FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE BINARY MODEL OF DISTRESS AS AN EMOTIONAL REGULATION MODEL
Terry DILORENZO*1, Daniel DAVID2, 3, Guy H. MONTGOMERY 3 1Stern College for Women, Yeshiva University, New-York, USA 2Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania 3Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York, USA Abstract The aims of the present study are to examine the relations between both general and specific rational and irrational beliefs, personality characteristics (optimism, pessimism), […]
Paul Lucian SZASZ Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania Abstract The present study investigated the relationships between two forms of ruminative thoughts, brooding, and reflective processing, in relation with irrational beliefs and their impact on distress. While significant amount of data support the role of irrational beliefs and depressive rumination as vulnerability factors in distress, no attempts […]
Florin A. SAVA, Laurenţiu P. MARICUŢOIU, Silvia RUSU, Irina MACSINGA, Delia VÎRGĂ West University of Timişoara, Timişoara, Romania Abstract The relationship between irrational beliefs and explicit and implicit self-esteem was examined in two consecutive studies (N1 = 117; N2 = 102) conducted on undergraduate university students. Two robust findings were the negative correlation between explicit […]
Knowledge has been the subject of different controversial theories in psychology; recently the idea that knowledge is grounded in the modal systems of the brain has gained considerable evidence. This paper discusses applications of the grounded cognition theory to irrational beliefs, a main concept of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT), proposed as core cognitive vulnerabilities for emotional disorders. Irrational beliefs, as grounded maladaptive emotional knowledge structures are considered the result of interactions between linguistic representations and simulations in motivational and emotional brain processing circuits. It is proposed that irrational beliefs (e.g., demandingness) are represented by distorted simulations in motivational and emotional brain processing circuits that bias the online processing of activating events. This biased emotional processing generates emotional disturbance. A three-level model of irrational beliefs is presented. The impact of irrational beliefs on emotions can be analyzed at the verbal or linguistic symbols level, at the simulations and modal symbols level and at the level of relations between verbal symbols and modal symbols. Maladaptive mechanisms and proposed corrective cognitive interventions are analyzed at each level. We conclude that a grounded perspective on irrational beliefs increases the explanatory power of the REBT theory of emotions.
MALADAPTIVE SCHEMAS, IRRATIONAL BELIEFS, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FIVE-FACTOR PERSONALITY MODEL
This paper examined the relationship between the Five-Factor model of personality and some maladaptive schemas and irrational beliefs as suggested by the Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT) framework. Data were gathered from 154 undergraduate students who completed four measures: DECAS Personality Inventory (a Romanian validated instrument for the Five-Factor model of personality), YSQ – L2 (Young Schema Questionnaire), ABS-2 (Attitudes and Beliefs Scale 2), and GABS-SV (General Attitudes and Beliefs Scale – Short Version). Emotional stability and agreeableness were negatively related to maladaptive schemas and irrational beliefs. While emotional stability was negatively associated with almost all schemas and irrational beliefs, agreeableness was inversely linked with schemas involved in externalizing psychopathology, such as mistrust, abandonment, entitlement and domination.
The purpose of this study is the adaptation of the Teacher Irrational Belief Scale – TIBS (Bernard, 1988). The scale was administered to a sample of 242 teachers from 4 high schools and 4 general schools. Our results are, on the whole, consistent with those obtained in earlier normative studies conducted on Australian population. The internal consistency coefficients (Cronbach’s Alpha) for the three beliefs and the global score ranged from .48 to .74, which are adequate for using the scale in reliable conditions. The factor analysis revealed 3 principal factors for the Romanian population, related to 3 core irrational beliefs (low frustration tolerance, self –downing and other demandingness). These results are different from those reported on Australian population, where 4 factors were found – low frustration tolerance, self-downing, authoritarianism and demand for justice, but authoritarianism and demand for justice seem to describe Ellis’s major irrational belief - other demandingness. The scores of TIBS are related to the scores of the Attitudes and Beliefs Scale 2 (ABS 2).
An empirical investigation of the relationship between religious beliefs, irrational beliefs, and negative emotions
The present studies have experimentally investigated the relationship between religious beliefs and negative emotions. We found that the mere association of a chain of negative events with the presence of a merciful and omnipotent spiritual being induced less worry and sadness and increased hope in the future than when the same events were presented alone. The former religious attitudes may intensify the impact of the actual religious beliefs in the generation of positive emotions. We also found that the meaning-making process induced by the religious beliefs is an implicit, tacit rather than an explicit inferential process. Also, subjects who (1) unconditionally accept themselves, (2) hold less self-downing beliefs (negative global self-evaluation) and (3) have more religious beliefs tend to experience lower levels of emotional distress under normal, non-traumatic circumstances. Also, participants who believe in the love and forgiveness from God tend to endorse less self-downing beliefs (one of the proximal causes of depression). Limits and implications for future research and practice are discussed.
The implementation of a rational-emotive educational intervention for anxiety in a 3rd grade classroom: an analysis of relevant procedural and developmental constraints
We tested the efficiency of a rational-emotive behavioral intervention to reduce the level of anxiety (emotional and behavioral) and remedy the irrational thinking in children (ages 9-10). The participants were 63 school-children (3 classes), boys and girls. They were initially evaluated with the Spence Anxiety Scale (for the general and specific anxiety level) and the CASI questionnaire (for the level of irrational beliefs). Their parents completed the Spence Anxiety Scale (parent version). There were 3 groups (classes): rational-emotive behavioral education (REBE), sham intervention (a Placebo type group), no intervention. The intervention lasted for 20 sessions and we assessed the level of irrational beliefs (CASI) and the general and specific anxiety (Spence Anxiety Scale) before and after the intervention. Results did not show a significant improvement of the REBE group compared to the others, neither in measures of anxiety, nor in those of irrationality. The level of REBE specific knowledge (tested with a knowledge questionnaire) after the intervention was significantly higher in the REBE group than in the other two groups. Parents’ evaluations differed from children’s own evaluations: they tended to overlook the existence or frequency of anxiety symptoms in their children. Possible implications and explanations are discussed. Implications envisage the efficiency of REBE in reducing the anxiety and irrational thinking of school-children and possible problems regarding its applications in the classroom.
An analysis of the relationship between irrational beliefs and automatic thoughts in predicting distress
The present study examined the relationship between irrational beliefs and automatic thoughts in predicting distress (i.e., depressed mood in patients with major depressive disorder). Although both constructs have been hypothesized and found to predict emotional reactions in stressful situations, the relationships between these two types of cognitions in predicting distress has not been sufficiently addressed in empirical studies. Our results show that both irrational beliefs and automatic thoughts are related to distress (i.e., depression/depressed mood), and that the effects of irrational beliefs on distress are partially mediated by automatic thoughts.
Aurora SZENTAGOTAI, Babes-Bolyai University, Department of Psychology, Cluj-Napoca, Romania Julie SCHNUR Mount Sinai School of Medicine, Biobehavioral and Integrative Medicine Programs, New York, U.S.A., Raymond DiGIUSEPPE St. John’s University, Department of Psychology, New York, U.S.A., Bianca MACAVEI, Eva KALLAY, Babes-Bolyai University, Department of Psychology, Cluj-Napoca, Romania Daniel DAVID, Babes-Bolyai University, Department of Psychology, Cluj-Napoca, Romania […]
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